I.

Introduction
Corporation and has become a well-recognized leader in the study of the underserved consumer market for financial products and services. In addition, CFSI has been instrumental in bringing together mainstream financial services firms and innovators developing solutions aimed at better serving the financial needs of the unbanked and underbanked communities. Part of CFSI's recent research has focused on examining the opportunities and challenges to incorporating alternative data into credit risk scores for underserved consumers. Arjan Schütte has been a significant contributor to this effort and, therefore, led the presentation by CFSI. 3 CFSI's research served as the framework for the ensuing workshop discussion. 4 To examine the market for alternative data, Schütte began his remarks by defining the terms thin-file and no-file in the context of consumer credit reports used by lenders.
He also discussed challenges that thin-and no-file consumers face in accessing traditional 1 For more information on the Center for Financial Services Innovation, see its website at www.cfsinnovation.com/about.php. 2 "Alternative data" refers to payment-related information that is not typically reported to credit reporting agencies. Examples include rent, telecommunication, utility, and insurance payments. financial products and services. 5 Tescher and Schütte commented that, historically, these consumers, as a group, were generally assumed to be bad risks because of their limited or nonexistent credit histories and were routinely denied access to traditional forms of credit. On the contrary, Schütte argued that CFSI's research suggests that, in fact, a significant portion of these consumers regularly meet their financial obligations and can be profitable bank customers. He characterized the promise of alternative data as an opportunity to better differentiate between those thin-and no-file consumers who are truly bad risks from those who may, in fact, resemble a more typical bank customer. If alternative data can be shown to effectively predict risk for such consumers, traditional lenders may be able to build credit scores that more accurately reflect default and delinquency risks for this population and thereby safely make more loans to a broader population. Schütte stressed that such analysis will also help move underserved, yet creditworthy, individuals into the financial mainstream with better access to lower priced traditional credit products.
While there is much excitement about using credit scoring to expand markets, Schütte acknowledged that, in today's financial institutions, the use of alternative data in credit scoring is still evolving and has yet to be widely adopted. To provide an understanding of how the market for alternative data is developing, Schütte examined aspects of both the demand and supply sides that are acting as incentives in the current marketplace. He also noted several additional factors affecting the development of the market for alternative data: the costs and complexity of changes to IT infrastructure, legal and regulatory hurdles, and the broader economic impacts of extending the market for consumer credit. In concluding his remarks, Schütte noted that incorporating alternative data into credit scoring models will not necessarily benefit all consumers. At the same time, he emphasized that there is evidence that some alternative payment data when applied to consumers with thin-or no-credit files can improve lenders' ability to differentiate between high-and low-risk profiles in these historically harder-to-score populations.
II. Thin-and No-File Consumers
In the United States, risk-based pricing of credit is built upon a foundation of voluntary information-sharing among firms that extend credit to consumers. This information helps form a credit report -a history of a consumer's experience using and managing his or her credit accounts -and is composed of individual identifying information, account data, money-related public records, collection agency reports, and credit inquiries. The data are compiled by credit reporting agencies (CRAs), the largest of which are national agencies, including TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax. 6 According to CFSI, the CRAs maintain credit reports on over 180 million U.S. consumers, more than 83 percent of the total U.S. adult population as of July 2003. CRAs provide credit reports to those entities with a permissible purpose to access these reports, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Permissible purposes include: 1) in response to a court order or subpoena; 2) with the written permission of the consumer; 3) to extend credit or review or collection of an existing credit account; 4) for employment purposes; 5) for insurance underwriting; 6) in compliance with government financial responsibility laws; and 7) for legitimate business needs. 7 Credit scoring models that leverage individuals' credit histories are intrinsic to today's consumer lending markets. Without such histories, thin-and no-file consumers are more often relegated to financial products and services offered outside mainstream banking. As a result, Schütte noted that these consumers, in most cases, pay higher fees and are less likely to have financial relationships that contribute data to credit reporting agencies, data that are necessary to build a record of payment performance that can be used in future lending decisions.
To have a credit report with one of the three national reporting agencies, an individual must have some experience with credit that can be reported by lenders to the agencies. Without such "history," a search for a credit report would result in a "no hit,"
and the individual would be considered a "no-file" consumer. Examining the wide variety of payments consumers make, Schütte acknowledged that it is not yet clear which are best suited for inclusion in credit scoring models.
Examples of alternative types of payments include utilities, telecommunications, insurance, rent, check cashing activity, payday loans, prepaid cards, and remittances, among others. 13 To determine which of these may be most useful to lenders' risk analysis, Schütte suggested that alternative data be analyzed along three specific dimensions in accordance with a framework proposed by the Information Policy
Institute.
14 First, he suggests that analysts should consider whether the underlying transaction is "cash-like" or "credit-like": in essence this means whether a consumer is paying for a service before or at the time of receipt or, instead, receives the product or service first and pays for it later. Utility and telecommunication consumer contracts are good examples of credit-like payments, whereby a person receives the good, that is, water, electricity, or phone service, and then pays the bill for such service later, typically at the end of a monthly billing period. The premise is that transactions that are more credit-like will be more helpful in determining the likelihood of whether a thin-or no-file consumer will make future payments on traditional credit products.
The second dimension relates to coverage or the extent to which an underlying transaction is conducted by the population at large, the assumption being that if coverage is extensive, data analysis standards can be efficiently applied across a large population.
Otherwise, if coverage is limited, the incremental benefit associated with gathering the data may be less than needed to justify the costs associated with doing so.
The third dimension relates to the concentration of data furnishers. For example, rent payments are an example of a quasi-credit-like transaction, but such payments are also made to a multitude of individual landlords without an existing universal mechanism for consolidating the reporting of such data. Comprehensive reporting of rent payments would require thousands of small landlords to report payment data. On the other hand, if 14 The Information Policy Institute, "Giving Underserved Consumers Better Access to the Credit System: The Promise of Non-Traditional Data" (July 2005) .
the concentration of furnishers is high, scale efficiencies are gained, making it more likely that the effort to report the alternative payment data can be economically justified.
Based on these three criteria, Schütte noted that the Information Policy Institute's report identified utility and telecommunication payments as two types of credit-like alternative transactions that have characteristics that would allow for a broad application at a potentially reasonable cost.
Finally, as an introduction to how alternative data are currently gathered and shared with lenders, Schütte described several types of organizations that are focusing on the market for alternative data. Such firms fall into three broad categories: data furnishers, data repositories, and data scoring firms. 15 Schütte used PRBC 16 as one example of a firm that, to some extent, is performing each of these functions. PRBC gathers and consolidates full-file information using only alternative data supplied by consumers or third parties such as bill-pay companies and check cashers with the express purpose of helping individuals build more robust credit profiles. The data are then used to create a score 17 that can be used when consumers are in the market for credit, for example, when applying for a mortgage or an auto loan. Schütte also cited the Fair Isaac FICO Expansion Score as a scoring method based on alternative data that can help 15 Data furnishers are those companies that report alternative data to repositories that warehouse and manage the databases storing the data. Data scoring firms provide the analysis necessary to rank consumer risk based on the consumer payment information held in the data repository. Tescher and Schütte noted that, by their count, there are at least 20 companies operating in the market for alternative data in one or more of these capacities. 16 As described on its website, PRBC is "an FCRA compliant credit repository that enables consumers and small business owners to build a credit file and score, based on their history of making rent and other recurring bill payments, that can be used to demonstrate creditworthiness when applying for housing, credit, insurance, and employment." For more information, visit www.prbc.com/main/about.php. 17 PRBC uses the FICO Expansion Score for mortgage lending, but otherwise does not have an in-house predictive score. Lenders are able to apply their own scores to PRBC consumer data.
lenders determine a risk score for thin-and no-file consumers. 18 As described by Schütte, the data furnisher or the supply side of the market for alternative data is evolving, with many new and well-established companies contributing data or analytics to scoring methods that incorporate at least some elements of alternative data in order to improve underwriting decisions. As more research is undertaken to determine the predictability of alternative data and as lenders show more interest in better evaluating risk for underserved consumers, Schütte believes that the supply-side market will also mature.
III. Key Influences on Supply and Demand for Alternative Data
The development of a market for alternative data is contingent on demand by lenders and supply by data furnishers. Lender demand hinges on the incremental benefit gained by incorporating alternative data into credit underwriting and other business decision models. While obstacles remain, several of which are described in more detail in the next section, lender demand will grow as it becomes evident that such data will allow profitable portfolio expansion. On the other hand, supply of alternative data will expand as the benefits to sharing full-file information with data repositories is determined to outweigh the costs of reporting.
Central to increasing demand for alternative data is its usefulness in risk containing at least one alternative trade line reported on a full-file basis, that is, both positive and negative data. These files included thick-, thin-, and no-file consumers. The treatment sample, along with a control group, was examined at two points in time to determine, among other things, whether the inclusion of the alternative data improved estimates of risk probability. 19 As Schütte described, the results of this study indicated that the addition of even one trade line related to either a utility or telecommunications payment proved useful. In particular, Schütte noted that the results showed improved predictive power for several commercial scoring models. 20 This result was primarily tied to an ability to newly score those individuals who couldn't previously be scored because they had either thin-or no-credit files, rather than an improvement in predicting risk for those who already had credit scores based solely on traditional data.
CFSI has also examined the results of separate, but similar, tests using alternative data conducted by risk-modeling firms Fair Isaac, LexisNexis, and L2C. As described by Schütte, the results showed that by using alternative data, these firms were able to 1) score a significant portion of loan applicants without a traditional credit score and 2) effectively measure risk among thin-and no-file applicants. Schütte argued that consumers will have more incentive to pay utility bills consistently and on time if they know that negative payment performance will be reported to CRAs and will affect their credit scores. Similarly, consumers who know that positive data will also be reported may be motivated by the opportunity to build positive payment histories with CRAs. In both cases, these incentives should lead to reduced On the surface, any meaningful reduction of these costs should serve as a significant incentive for sharing customer payment data by utility companies. Ultimately, the strength of this incentive will hinge on whether sharing full-file data with credit reporting agencies truly leads to changes in consumers' payment behavior. Unfortunately, the report's survey population was relatively small given utility companies' continued concerns regarding existing data-sharing regulation. As a result, there is little empirical evidence to date to measure effects on consumer behavior. 24 To overcome these hurdles and encourage some alternative data furnishers to voluntarily share full-file payment data, Schütte acknowledged that a form of monetary payment may be necessary by those on the demand side of the market.
IV. Other Factors Affecting the Developing Market for Alternative Data
Schütte touched on several additional factors affecting the development of the market for alternative data: the costs and complexity of changes to IT infrastructure, legal and regulatory hurdles, and the broader economic impacts of extending the market for consumer credit.
Many operational adjustments are required by both data furnishers and lenders in order to make available and incorporate alterative data into the credit risk analysis process. In many cases, costly up-front investments need to be made to modify legacy transmissions will incur some additional and ongoing technical and servicing costs for data furnishers. As described in the previous section, data furnishers must see an associated benefit to justify these costs, preferably in the form of reduced default and delinquency by customers rather than less attractive options such as stricter control of access to credit reports or simple monetary incentives.
Lenders will also face costs associated with incorporating alternative data into large and complex automated lending systems. Much of these costs are associated with modifications to IT systems, for example, file formatting changes necessary to set up and maintain systems to receive alternative data. Costs may also arise to the extent that incorporating alternative data into existing loan decision models reduces the level of automation in this process. A much less obvious but critical obstacle for lenders may occur in the area of credit portfolio securitizations. Very generally, lenders are able to securitize loan pools that are valued and assigned risk ratings by credit rating agencies. As part of this NPRM, regulations and guidelines "would implement the requirement that the Agencies issue guidelines for use by furnishers regarding the accuracy and integrity of the information about consumers that they furnish to consumer reporting agencies…" The NPRM outlines two approaches -the regulatory definition approach and the guidelines definition approach -to defining the terms "accuracy" and "integrity." The regulatory definition approach calls for the definition of "integrity" to mean "that any information that a furnisher provides to a CRA about an account or other relationship with the consumer does not omit any term, such as a credit limit or opening date, of that account or other relationship, the absence of which can reasonably be expected to contribute to an incorrect evaluation by a user of a To the extent that using alternative data to underwrite new loans is successful, lenders are introducing a new and unfamiliar segment of borrowers into their portfolios. lower-cost borrowing alternatives will be more likely to "select" the higher-priced loan, exposing that lender to greater than expected default risk. Interestingly, using alternative data for risk scoring for thin-and no-file consumers can help mitigate adverse selection to a point where lenders may engage these borrowers. But adverse selection will remain more of a concern with this population than it is with those who have long histories of traditional payment performance on which to base lending decisions. As explained by Hunt, moral hazard occurs when a party that is insulated from risk behaves differently than it would if it were fully exposed to the risk. When alternative payment data are reported to CRAs -for example, utility or telecommunications payment information as described in the earlier discussion -lenders will have more information about borrowers, and lenders can then use these data when deciding with whom and at what price they do business. Consequently, thin-and no-file consumers will be less able to avoid reputational costs associated with not paying alternative-type billers. Hence, these consumers are no longer as insulated from risk as they once were, and therefore, the problem of moral hazard may lessen for this population.
As lenders move toward incorporating alternative data into their risk scoring models and building bridges for thin-and no-file consumers to traditional credit products and services, the broader economic impacts -such as those described above -are important considerations. Developing a better understanding of these impacts will require continued and focused attention not only in the financial services industry but also among community development organizations, alternative data furnishers and repositories, and policymakers.
V. Conclusion
In summary, the continued evolution of supply and demand for alternative data in the credit information markets will center on crucial factors such as whether there is a business case motivating furnishers of alternative data to voluntarily share payment information with data repositories and whether the data can help to predict default and delinquency risk for those consumers with thin-and no-credit files. While obstacles remain in moving toward incorporating alterative data into lending decisions by traditional financial institutions, there also seem to be real social and economic incentives for doing so.
